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Abstract 
 
Three experimental studies are reported, the first two of which explore differences in 
advisors’ and decision makers’ preferences, and differences in personal decisions in the near 
and the distant future. It was expected that preferences of advisors would be more similar to 
those of distant future decision makers than of near future decision makers. This prediction 
was supported. In Experiment 1, advisors (both pure advisors and decision makers for others) 
and distant future decision makers made more action choices than near future decision 
makers, thus only for low life-impact situations. In Experiment 2 advisors and distant future 
decision makers made more desirability choices than near future decision makers. These 
results indicate some similarities in representation of the decision problem due to a 
psychological distance to the event, which construal level theory could account for. 
Experiment 3 explores decision makers’ and advisors’ responsibility from the perspective of 
both decision makers and advisors. Responsibilities are explored both without knowledge of 
decision outcomes, and with two levels of outcome (moderately and severely 
negative).Decision makers are generally perceived as being much more responsible for a 
decision than advisors, both by the decision makers themselves and by the advisors. Advisors, 
on the other hand, perceived themselves as more responsible than did decision makers. 
Decision outcomes are found to have an impact on perception of responsibility. Decision 
makers perceived their own responsibility to increase with knowledge of negative decision 
outcomes, while they perceived advisors' responsibility to decrease. Advisors, on the other 
hand, perceived their own responsibility to decrease with knowledge of moderate outcomes, 
and to increase with knowledge of severely negative outcomes. 
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The act of soliciting other people’s opinions prior to making a decision is a common practice, 
both in private and professional life. A great deal of research has been conducted on how 
people make decisions for themselves (e.g., Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997; Kahneman, Slovic, 
& Tversky, 1982). Although advice plays such a central part in real-life decision making, it 
has been given little consideration either in empirical studies or in theories of decision making 
until recently. Consequently, an integrative theory to understand the phenomenon of advice, 
as a whole is lacking (Yaniv, 2004b).  
Yaniv emphasizes that advice is related to other and much older areas of psychology. 
Among these are attitude change (Jones & Harris, 1967), persuasion and small group 
processes (Kerr & Tindale, 2004), combinations of expert opinions, linear models of 
judgement (Armstrong, 2001), and models of information integration (Anderson, 1968).  
Research on advice giving has found advice given to others to differ from decisions 
made for oneself (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006); it suggests that advisors weigh attributes 
differently than do personal decision makers, and that advisors are more prone to use 
decision-making norms (Stone & Allgaier, in press).  
A major motivation for decision makers to take advice has been found to be the 
opportunity to share responsibility for a decision (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Promberger & 
Baron, 2006). To our knowledge, no further research on responsibility for advice givers and 
decision makers has been conducted within the advice tradition, and thus little knowledge 
exists in this domain. 
The main purpose of the present research was twofold. The first purpose was to 
explore the difference between peoples’ own preferences and the advice they give to others. 
The research reported above suggests that advice givers are more concerned with general 
norms, while personal decision makers consider more aspects of the decision problem. 
Construal Level Theory (CLT) (Trope & Liberman, 2003) suggests that people’s preferences 
differ with psychological distance to an event, in that individuals tend to represent 
psychologically distant events by their essential, abstract and global features (high-level 
construal), whereas psychologically near events are represented by their peripheral, concrete, 
and local features (low-level construal). In line with this, Trope and Liberman found 
preferences to differ with temporal distance. We explored whether advice represents 
psychological distance from a decision problem (similarly to temporal distance) by comparing 
advice and distant future decisions.  
The second purpose was to learn more about the perception of responsibility for a 
decision when advice was provided. No research has previously been conducted on this 
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subject. We explored perceived responsibility for both decision makers and advice givers as 
seen from the perspectives of both decision makers and advisors. Advisors’ and decision 
makers’ perceptions of responsibility were explored both with and without knowledge of 
negative decision outcomes (moderately and severely negative).   
 
Previous Research on Advice: Decision Making and Advice Giving 
 
The first article on advice was published by Brehmer and Hagafors in 1986. Recently, advice 
has received greater attention from researchers. Studies within this “advice tradition” differ 
with regard to perspective. The perspectives have been from either decision makers (advice 
takers) or advice givers, where undoubtedly the advice taking perspective has received the 
most research attention. Advice taking research has primarily emphasized research on 
decision makers utilizing or discounting advice, advisor and decision maker accuracy, and 
confidence. This line of research has found decision makers to be less likely to follow advice 
as much as they ought to, in order to improve the accuracy of their decisions (egocentric 
advice discounting, e.g., Yaniv, 2004b; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Further, decision makers 
have been found to improve decision accuracy by utilizing advice (e.g., Armstrong, 2001; 
Gardner & Berry, 1995; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 1997; Yaniv, 2004a; Yaniv & 
Milyavsky, in press). In addition, decision makers have been found to be more likely to 
follow advice when it comes from more confident decision makers (e.g., Phillips, 1999; Price 
and Stone, 2004; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001; Van Swol & 
Sniezek, 2005; and see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006, for an extensive literature review). Advice 
giving, on the other hand, has primarily emphasized the difference between advisors’ 
recommendations and decision makers’ choices (Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, & Allgaier, 
2003; Fischhoff, 1992; Jonas and Frey, 2003; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2005; Kray, 2000; 
Kray & Gonzales, 1999; Stone & Allgaier, in press).  
The present study concerns the advice giving rather than advice taking. In the 
following, an introduction to research conducted on advice giving within the advice tradition, 
and an introduction to construal level theory (CLT ) will be presented. Additionally, some of 
the CLT studies relevant for the present work will be presented. One first notes that although 
advisors also make decisions by deciding what advice to give, the term decision maker in this 
text refers to the actors who make decisions for themselves. 
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Advice giving:  Self vs. Other Differences in Choice and Weighing of Dimensions  
Research on advice giving suggests that advisors and personal decision makers weigh 
advantages and disadvantages of important decisions differently. According to Kray and 
Gonzales (1999), this difference might be caused by different decision strategies, where 
personal choices follow a trade-off strategy (several dimensions are considered) whereas 
advice giving follows a lexicographical strategy (one dimension is primary) (see Tversky, 
Sattah & Slovic, 1988). 
  Fischhoff (1992) observed differences in perceptions of strategies designed to reduce 
the risk of sexual assault. Advisors (men and experts on sexual assault) were found to 
emphasize the importance of personal safety and reduced risk, whereas the potential rape 
victims (women) were found to weigh the costs (e.g., limitation of freedom) of the advisors’ 
prevention strategies in addition to the gains.  
 Similar results were found by Kray and Gonzalez (1999) when examining self-other 
differences in multi-attribute choices. They proposed that when people make decisions for 
themselves, they weigh attributes more uniformly than when giving advice. For example, 
Kray and Gonzalez (experiment 1) asked their participants to choose between two potential 
jobs, either for themselves or as advice for a friend. The two jobs differed in two dimensions: 
personal satisfaction and salary. Job A was better in terms of salary whereas job B provided 
more personal satisfaction, which is the most important dimension for most people. More 
participants in the advice-giving conditions favoured job A, while in the self-choice condition, 
participants chose jobs A and B more evenly. Kray and Gonzales further found that only the 
lower-valued dimension (salary) changed weight dependent on the perspective (self-choice vs. 
advice), which they interpreted as consistent with the suggested model that one dimension 
becomes primary in advice giving.   
 Note that the key element of Kray and Gonzales’s (1999) framework is that advisors 
give more weight to the most important dimension (since importance of the lower-valued 
dimension decreases) when giving advice, and note that a shift takes place in the most 
prominent value (the most highly valued dimension does not change). They further suggest 
that the self-other difference emerges as a result of some aspect of the decision process itself, 
and not as a result of lack of advisor motivation. Advisors have been found to exhibit greater 
concern about the accuracy of their recommendations than personal decision makers, and to 
exert more task related effort (Jonas & Frey, 2003; Kray, 2000). 
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Norms and Advice 
Kray and Gonzales (1999; Kray, 2000) emphasize that advisors tend to recommend options 
that most judges would prefer, whereas personal decision makers make choices consistent 
with their own perhaps idiosyncratic preferences. A similar argument is promoted by Stone 
and Allgaier (in press). Stone and Allgaier (also Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp & Allgaier, 2003) 
conducted a study using a social value analysis of self-other differences in decision making 
involving risk taking.  Their results demonstrated that people made more risky decisions for 
others in domains where risk taking was valued. For example, in one of their experiments, 
participants had the option of choosing to introduce themselves to an attractive person at a 
party, or to stay with their friends. When providing advice, participants were much more 
likely to advice their friends to introduce themselves, whereas when deciding for themselves, 
participants were less likely to do so. It was actually regarded as inappropriate to make more 
risk-averse decisions for others than for oneself in situations where risk was positively valued 
(i.e., choosing for a single person not to introduce himself/herself). Interestingly, they found 
that participants made more risky decisions for others, even though they predicted that others 
would have made the same decisions as themselves (taking less risk). However, in areas 
where risk was not valued, people where found to make less risky decisions for others than for 
themselves, for example, in monetary gambling. 
 Stone and Allgaier (in press) define social values as “people’s perceptions of …others’ 
value priorities” (p.11). Perceived group value may or may not correspond to the group’s 
actual value system. They argue that there is a decision-making norm for how to decide for 
others that results from people’s perceptions of whether risk is valued. This norm is stronger 
when deciding for others than for oneself, which may explain the differences in decisions that 
one makes for oneself versus those made for others. The argument of Stone and Allgair is also 
similar to that of Teigen, Olsen, and Solås (2005), who conducted a series of studies designed 
to determine the factors that influence people’s choices of gifts and how these choices 
correspond to the preferences of the gift recipients. They found that gift buyers, in general, 
prefer more exclusive, high-quality items, whereas gift receivers preferred more useful gifts. 
Teigen et al. suggest that these results could be due to gift buyers’ greater concern with norms 
regarding gift exchange than that of recipients, and not to perceived differences between self 
and others. Stone and Allgair point out that in both their study and that of Teigen et al., a 
similar picture emerges. Advisors are less concerned with identifying the unique desires of the 
person they are deciding for, and more concerned with following the proper decision making 
norm.  
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 Personal decision making and providing advice to others, give different perspectives 
to a decision problem. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), different perspectives are 
most likely to result in a different framing of the decision problem. Tversky and Kahneman 
emphasize that a change in perspective often reverses the relative desirability of options. The 
frame a decision maker adopts is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and 
partly by norms, habits and personal characteristics of the decision maker.  
 
Construal Level Theory (CLT) 
 
Trope and Liberman (2003) propose that individuals tend to represent psychologically distant 
events on a higher (more abstract) construal level, and psychological near events on a lower 
(more concrete) construal level. High-level construal can be described as more schematic with 
superordinate and decontextualized representations that extract the central feature of events, 
whereas low-level construal tends to include subordinate, contextual, and incidental features 
of events. Thus, low-level construal is richer and more detailed than high-level construal, 
which is more structured and parsimonious. Goals are central in CLT. Superordinate goals are 
most important for a high level of construal, while subordinate goals are central to a low level 
of construal. As pointed out by Trope and Liberman (2000), this idea bears some similarity to 
action identification theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), which states that superordinate goals 
refer to “why action is performed” and subordinate goals refer to “how action is performed”. 
Consequently, any changes in the features of high-level construal produce major changes in 
the meaning of the event (goal relevant), whereas changes in low-level construal produce 
relatively minor changes in the meaning of the event (goal irrelevant). Moreover, the 
importance of values in CLT should be noted, or rather, that of the shift in values. CLT 
proposes that a shift in the most prominent value appears with psychological distance to an 
event. 
 Trope and Liberman (2003) propose that construal level underlies a broad range of 
evaluative and behavioural consequences of psychological distance to events. Although CLT 
proposes that psychological distance can be in the form of temporal (Trope & Liberman, 
2003), spatial (Nussbaum, Libeman &Trope, 2006), hypothetical versus real events (Armor & 
Sackett, 2006), and social distance (Smith & Trope, 2006), the main body of research to date 
has been on temporal distance (e.g., Eyal, Libeman, Trope & Walther, 2004; Liberman & 
Trope, 1998, 2003; Liberman, Sagristano & Trope, 2002; Nussbaum, Trope & Liberman, 
2003, 2006; Trope & Liberman, 2000, 2003).  
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 In this paper, we suggest that the difference between advisors and decision makers can 
also be conceptualized as a kind of psychological distance. People making immediate or near 
future decisions are, according to CLT, likely to represent the information at a low level of 
construal, in which they consider and value more of the contextual information, the low-level 
goals and the “how” aspects of the decision problem. People making distant future decisions, 
on the other hand are, according to CLT, more likely to represent information ay a high level 
of construal, in which the “how” aspects are less valued and the superordinate goals, 
concerning the “why”, are more prominent. Similarly, in advice research, decision makers are 
found to value more dimensions of a decision problem, whereas advisors are found to give 
most value to the most important dimension. We suggest that decision makers and advisors 
have different perspectives to a decision problem, and, moreover, that more immediate or near 
future decision makers and distant-future decision makers have different perspectives on a 
decision problem. Consequently, preferences might differ when giving advice and when 
making decisions, but because both advisors and distant future decision makers are 
psychologically distant from a decision problem, such preferences might become more 
similar.  
 Note that we do not suggest that preferences will be identical, because several 
differences still exist between advisors and decision makers with temporal distance. One 
difference has to do with consequences. People who make decisions for distant future, are not 
faced with any immediate consequences, whereas people who make immediate or near-future 
decisions are most likely to be faced with more immediate consequences. Advisors, on the 
other hand, are in fact not faced with any direct consequences at all (only more indirectly, like 
blame), giving them a perspective that resembles, but is still not identical with distant future 
decision makers. Further, advisors do not have full access to the decision makers’ personal 
characteristics (e.g. individual likings and experience), and thus situational differences 
between advisors’ and distant future decision makers’ preferences might appear. Hence, we 
believe psychological distance to be even greater for advice giving than with distant future 
decision making.  
 
Preference with Temporal Distance:  Desirability vs. Feasibility 
Liberman and Trope’s extensive research program on temporal construal has demonstrated 
how preference and prediction change in near versus distant future (Trope & Liberman, 
2003). However, Liberman and Trope’s (1998) research on desirability and feasibility 
considerations is of particular interest for our present work and will be given particular 
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attention. Liberman and Trope have demonstrated how temporal distance increases the weight 
of desirability aspects and decreases the weight of feasibility aspects in preferences regarding 
future activities. Desirability is the value of an action’s end state, a high-level aspect that 
refers to why the action should be taken, whereas feasibility is the ease or difficulty of 
reaching the end state, and is a low-level aspect that refers to how action is taken. In Liberman 
and Trope’s study (experiment 2), a situation was described where a guest lecture was held at 
campus. Participants were asked to rate the importance of two reasons for attending the 
lecture: hearing an interesting lecture (desirability) and having the lecture held at a convenient 
time (feasibility). The importance of the interesting dimension (desirability) increased with 
temporal distance, whereas the importance of convenience (feasibility) decreased with 
temporal distance. Similar results where found when participants rated their preferences for a 
living room set. The importance of liking (desirability) the living room set increased with 
temporal distance, while the importance of having the living room set delivered (feasibility) 
decreased with temporal distance. However, the value of the desirability consideration 
remained high in both near and distant future decisions, regardless of whether feasibility was 
high (in near future) or low (in distant future). Liberman and Trope emphasize that this 
finding supports their suggestion that desirability considerations constitute a higher level of 
construal than do feasibility considerations. 
Similar to desirability and feasibility considerations, pro (arguments in favour of 
taking action) considerations are generally found to be at a higher level of construal than con 
(arguments in favour of abstaining from action) considerations (Eyal et al., 2004). Pro 
considerations tend to be more salient in thinking about distant future activities than in near 
future activities. For example, in deciding whether to take a trip in the more distant future, the 
argument “visiting interesting places” (pro) would become more salient than the argument 
“long tiring journey” (con). Conversely, cons were found to be more salient in thinking about 
the relatively near future.  
 
Responsibility and Advice 
 
Although the domain of advice has recently received more research attention, surprisingly 
little research has been conducted on the division of responsibility and advice. Consequently, 
little knowledge exists on the perceived responsibility for a decision when advice is utilized. 
Promberger and Baron (2006) conducted a study on how likely people were of accept a 
medical recommendation when it came from a computer program rather than a physician. 
- 8 - 
They found participants more likely to follow a medical recommendation when it came from 
a physician rather than a computer program. However, more interestingly, the participants 
reported that they would feel less responsible for their decision if they followed the 
recommendation (especially the physician’s recommendation) rather than if they did not. This 
is consistent with Harvey and Fischer’s (1997) results indicating that sharing of responsibility 
was one reason for utilize advice.  
LeBoeuf and Norton (2006) investigated how outcomes of events influenced perceived 
causes of events. They found a tendency for participants to match magnitude. A “big” 
negative outcome (e.g. the killing of Kennedy led to the death of 40 000 American soldiers in 
the Vietnam War) was matched with a “bigger” cause (e.g., the killing was due to a 
conspiracy). A “small” negative outcome (the killing of Kennedy did not make a difference to 
the outcome of the Vietnam War) was matched with a “smaller” cause (e.g., the killing was a 
result of a lone gunman). Similar matching also occurred with valence, where positive 
outcomes were matched with positive causes and negative outcomes were matched with 
negative causes. This observed difference in appraisal of causes on the basis of severity of 
consequences is interesting with regard to perceived responsibility of advice. Perhaps the 
perception of responsibility is not constant in magnitude, but varies with knowledge of 
consequences and also perhaps with severity of decision outcomes.  
 
Present Research 
 
We had two main agendas with the present work. Experiments 1 and 2 were primarily 
designed to explore the possibility that advice giving represents a psychological distance from 
a decision problem, in a similar manner as temporal distance (and is possibly even a larger 
distance). This could make construal level a plausible explanation for the observed self-other 
difference in decision making. Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that fewer action choices 
would be made for oneself in the near future, rather than for oneself in the distant future and 
when giving advice (also when making decisions for others). Experiment 2 tested the 
hypothesis that fewer desirability choices (options with a high value on desirability) would be 
made for oneself in the near future, rather than for oneself in the distant future and when 
giving advice. Additionally, feasibility considerations (the ease or difficulty of reaching the 
end state) were expected to be less important both when considering actions in the distant 
future, and when giving advice, compared to when deciding for oneself in the present or near 
future.  
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The second main agenda with the present work was to explore advisors’ and decision 
makers’ perceptions of responsibility for a decision. In experiment 1, advisors’ perceptions of 
their own and decision makers’ responsibility were explored. Experiment 3 was designed to 
explore advisor’s and decision maker’s responsibility, both from the perspective of advisors 
and decision makers (actors). Moreover, we explored whether knowledge of a negative 
decision outcome would have any impact on perceived responsibility, and in such case, 
whether level of negative (moderately and severely) outcome makes a difference. To our 
knowledge, the responsibility of both decision makers and advisors has never been studied 
before, so little empirical and theoretical knowledge exist in this domain.  
 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Many decision situations involve a choice between two options that could be called action 
versus inaction, respectively: To accept or to forego an offer, to speak up or to remain quiet, 
to get up or to remain in bed. Of these alternatives, the inaction option seems often to be the 
most convenient, at least in the sense that it requires the least amount of effort in the current 
situation. This has resulted in decision-making biases called “inaction bias”, “omission bias” 
and sometimes “status quo bias” in the research literature (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Schweitzer, 
1994, Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) 
The first goal of experiment 1 was to compare action and inaction choices for a 
decision maker who is deciding for himself/herself in the present (self near-future), compared 
to decisions in situations that may occur at a later point in time (self distant-future). Inaction 
follows more from a feasibility concern. We would thus expect more action choices in the 
distant than in the near future. 
The second goal was to compare action or inaction choices made by a decision maker 
for himself or herself with advice given to others. In advising others, considerations 
associated with the current situation, immediate difficulties and inconveniences could be 
expected to play a less prominent role, leading to a less prominent inaction bias and more 
action choices. We explored two levels of advice, pure advice (where the final decision is 
made by the actor) and decisions made for others (where the advisor knows that the actor will 
follow his or her advice). Pure advisors are found to make balanced information search, 
whereas advisors as decision makers for others, are found to make more confirmatory (in 
support of preferred choice) information search, similar to personal decision makers (Jonas et 
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al. 2005). This suggests that the preference of for pure advisors might differ from the 
preferences of decision makers.  
 It follows that the advice people give to others should bear some similarity to the 
decisions they make for themselves in the distant future, or at least that the advice they give 
should be more similar to the decisions they make for themselves in the future, than the 
decisions they make for themselves in the here and now.  
Additionally, we explored the advisors’ perception of their own and decision makers 
responsibility for the decision. By asking participants to perform responsibility ratings on a 
percentage scale, we will gain information about their views on responsibility as a limited or 
unlimited quantity: is there a fixed quantity of 100% responsibility that has to be shared 
between those who contribute to the decision, or is there no upper limit for the total 
responsibility so the decision maker can be 100% responsible, with still some responsibility 
left for the advisor.   
Further, we explored decision makers’ awareness of what advice they were likely to 
receive form others, and whether any discrepancy existed between decision maker’s 
expectancy and the actual advice that was provided. Finally, decision-difficulty was 
investigated. Decision-difficulty might be perceived differently when making action or 
inaction choices and when having psychological distance to the decision task.  
 
Method 
 
Participants  
Participants were 241 students attending an introductory class in psychology at the University 
of Oslo (176 women and 61 men, 4 did not indicate gender), with mean age of 22.9 years. 
They were randomly allocated to four different conditions by receiving different versions of 
the same basic questionnaire. 
 
Materials  
All participants received a questionnaire describing three personal decision making scenarios, 
where the decision maker had a choice between two options, an action alternative and a status 
quo alternative. The situations differed in importance, with the first situation as a situation 
with lower life stakes (life impact) than the last two, where decisions could have momentous 
consequences.  
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 Vacation scenario. In the first scenario, the decision maker is a student who is offered 
a cheap and tempting vacation to the south in the middle of the semester (interfering with the 
course work). Should the offer be accepted or rejected? 
 Abortion scenario. In the second scenario, the student discovers that she (for male 
participants: his partner) is pregnant. The pregnancy is unplanned and a baby will seriously 
interfere with study progression. The options were to seek abortion or not. 
 Job offer scenario. In the third scenario, the decision maker receives an unexpected 
attractive job offer and is confronted with the choice of leaving school and to accept the offer 
or to reject the offer and continue her or his studies towards graduation (for a detailed 
description of the scenarios, see Appendix A). 
 
Participants in Condition 1 (self, near-future) were asked to imagine themselves as 
actors and the situation as happening in the near future. 
In Condition 2 (self, distant-future), participants were asked to imagine that the 
situations could arise at some point in future.  
In the last two conditions, participants were asked to give advice to somebody else 
(same age and sex). In Condition 3 (other-decide) the actor was described as undecided and 
could be expected to rely on your advice, whereas in Condition 4 (other-advice) the actor felt 
free to follow the advice, or not. 
After choosing one option, participants were asked for each of the scenario (1) to rate 
how difficult they found the choice, on a five-point scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very 
difficult); and (2) to produce any number of reasons in favour of or against their decision 
(open question). 
Finally, participants in the Self conditions (1 and 2) were asked to rate on a five-point 
scale from 1 (certainly not) to 5 (certainly), how likely they would be to seek advice from 
others in each situation, and to mark which advice they would expect to receive.  
Participants in the advice conditions (3 and 4) were, instead, asked two questions 
about responsibility. How responsible would they (as advisors) be for the decisions, if the 
actor chose to follow their advice, and how responsible would the actors be? Both questions 
were answered by circling a number on percent scales from 0 (not at all responsible) to 100% 
responsible. 
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Results 
 
Action Preferences 
1,44
1,86 1,86 2
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Actor                                 Advisor
Participants were presented with three scenarios, where they were given the choice between 
committing an action (go on vacation, choose abortion, and accept a job offer), or decline to 
act. Figure 1 shows that action choices were least frequent in Condition 1, where the decision 
had to take place in the near future, and most frequent in Condition 4 (pure advice), with the 
other two conditions in between. A one-way ANOVA confirms that the mean numbers of 
action choices in the four conditions are significantly different, F(3, 218)= 4.627, p= .004. 
Thus, advices were, as predicted, generally more action oriented than decisions, in particular 
decisions concerning oneself in the immediate future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean number of action choices for self and other in three scenarios. Experiment 1. 
 
  
A closer look at the separate scenarios (as displayed in Table 1) shows that this pattern was 
particularly conspicuous in the vacation scenario. Only 38% would accept the vacation offer 
if it was presented to them today, whereas more than 72% would accept it if it was offered to 
them under similar conditions next year. They would also recommend the vacation offer to 
another student. The conditions differed much less in the abortion and in the job offer 
scenarios. These are high life-impact situations (Beisswanger et al., 2003), which might be 
decided according to guidelines of conduct that apply equally to self and others.  
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Table 1.  Preference for actions (percentages of participants) in four conditions, Experiment 1. 
          Expected advice in parentheses (Conditions 1 and 2 only)    
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Condition 1  Condition 2  Condition 3            Condition 4 
Scenario Self Near-future Self Distant-future Other-decides             Other-advice 
   (n=69)    (n=58)   (n=59)   (n=55) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Vacation 38.2   (72.1)  72.4    (78.9)  73.7   83.6 
Abortion 55.9   (64.5)  54.4    (66.7)  54.9   57.7  
Job offer 50.0   (42.9)  58.6    (52.8)  53.6   60.8 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Total  48.0   (59.8)  61.8    (66.1)  60.7   67.4 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Expected action advice in the two self choice conditions was similar to advice actually 
given (mean percentages of action choices = 63.0 vs. 64.1 for predicted advice and actual 
advice), showing that personal decision makers predict advices quite well. When examining 
the results for each scenario, differences in pattern of results emerge among situations (see 
table 1), mostly following the same pattern as action choices among conditions, with clearest 
results in the vacation scenario. 
 
Decision difficulty 
Difficulty ratings showed that the participants found deciding for others to be more difficult 
than advising others, with mean difficulty scores of 3.34 and 2.86 respectively; t(102)= 3.07, 
p=.003. They also felt that personal decisions for next year were more difficult than decisions 
for the near future, with mean difficulty scores of 3.32 vs. 2.89 respectively; t(122)= 2.69, p= 
.008. More interestingly, participants who made action choices felt that the decision had been 
more difficult than those who decided to abstain from action. This applied to all personal 
decisions, both in the near and in the distant future. As a consequence, participants who made 
none or only one action choice had an easier time than those who made two or three action 
choices, with mean difficulty ratings 2.83 vs. 3.26; t(121)= 2.62, p= .010. Making decisions 
for others followed the same pattern, with mean difficulty ratings 2.98 vs. 3.48; t(49)= 2.01, 
p= .051. However, action choices were not perceived more difficult when giving pure advice 
(M= 2.64 vs. 2.92; t(46)= 1.13, ns.) 
Personal decision makers are more likely to seek advice in the distant future than in 
the near future, with mean likelihood ratings 3.94 vs. 3.48; t(119)= 2.80, p= .006.  
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Responsibility  
Advisors responsibility ratings revealed, not very surprisingly, a substantial difference in 
perceived responsibility for decision maker and advisor, with mean responsibility ratings of 
90.7% for decision makers and 34.5% for advisors. However, it is worth noticing that 
advisors were perceived to have more responsibility in the other-decide condition than in the 
other-advice condition (see Table 2); t(101)=2.28, p= .025. This indicates that advisor was 
perceived more responsible when being in a position of deciding for someone else, but still 
perceived to be much less responsible than the actor. Further, it is worth noticing that 
participants differed in how they divided responsibility between actor and advisor. Most 
participants (55. 8%) perceived the actor to have a total responsibility of 100%, but 
additionally perceived advisor to have some responsibility, thereby exceeding 100% 
responsibility in total. More than one fourth of the participants (26.9%) regarded actor to have 
less than 100% responsibility, but still giving advisor enough responsibility to exceed 100 % 
in total. Only a minor proportion of the participants were particular about not exceeding a 
total of 100 % responsibility, 3.8 % regarded actor fully responsible and advisor not 
responsible at all, while 13.5% perceived actor less than fully responsibility and additionally 
giving some responsibility to advisor.  
 
Table 2. Mean responsibility for decisions in Conditions 3 and 4. Experiment 1. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Condition 3: Advisor decides  Condition 4: Pure advice 
   _________________________  _______________________ 
Scenarios    Actor   Advisor  Actor   Advisor 
     (n=55) (n=54)       (n=49)  (n=49) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Vacation     87.0       40.9        89.6  32.1 
Abortion     92.1       39.8       96.2    31.3 
Job offer     87.9  35.2       91.1  27.4 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Total      89.0     38.6        92.3  30.3 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
Pro and Con arguments 
Participants produced marginally fewer pro arguments in Condition 1 compared to the other 
conditions. The clearest difference was observed in the vacation scenario. In Condition 1 
(self, near future), 41. 8 % pro vacation arguments were generated (near future) against 51.5% 
in Condition 2, 64.6% in Condition 3 (other-decide), and 67.2% in condition 4 (other-advice). 
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When comparing Condition 1 and the more distant decision-making conditions (60.7%), a 
significant difference in generated pro arguments was observed, t(212)= 4,07, p< .001.  
 
Discussion 
These results demonstrate, in line with our predictions, that action choices were less 
prominent in near future decision making and more prominent in the distant future and both of 
the advice conditions. This suggests that the more “feasible option of  inaction”, is more likely 
to appear when people are making near future decisions, whereas when people are making 
decisions in the future, making decisions for others, or when giving advice, the more 
“desirable option of action” is more likely to appear. 
 There was, however, a difference between high and low life-impact situations. In the 
vacation situation (low life-impact), marked differences appeared in action choices between 
the near future condition and the other conditions, whereas hardly any noticeable differences 
were observed between conditions in the abortion scenario (high life-impact). A similar 
pattern of results was obtained by Beisswanger et.al. (2003). In a series of studies on self-
other difference in risk taking, they demonstrated how low life-impact situations produce self-
other differences when risk was valued, whereas high life-impact produce no differences. 
Importantly, these results suggest that action choices seem to follow a similar pattern both 
when making personal decisions in distant future and when providing advice (deciding for 
others and giving pure advice). Additionally, a similar pattern of choices are made when 
having a distance (both temporal and advice) to a decision problem both for high life-impact 
situations (no difference in any of the conditions) and low-impact situations (choices differs 
systematically when having distance to a decision task). We believe the present data support 
our proposition that advice givers and decision makers represent the decision problem in a 
similar manner. 
Interestingly, the current results suggest that advisors do perceive themselves 
responsible for the decision, and even more responsible when making decisions for others 
than when giving pure advice. Although advisors perceive themselves responsible for the 
decision, decision makers were perceived far most responsible for the decision. However, 
individual differences in perception were observed, and the present data suggests that decision 
makers can not generally rely on advisors to take any responsibility away from the decision 
makers. More questions arose from the results, like what about decision makers perception of 
their own and advisors responsibility? What about perception of responsibility with 
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knowledge of a decision outcome? These questions will be investigated more closely in 
Experiment 3. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 2 was designed to compare more directly predictions from two research 
traditions. Research within the CLT tradition has demonstrated that people have different 
preferences in the near and the far future (Trope & Liberman, 2003), whereas the advice 
tradition has demonstrated a difference between personal preferences and preferences when 
making recommendations to others (e.g. Beisswanger et al., 2003; Kray & Gonzalez, 1999; 
Stone & Allgaier, in press). 
To this end, two scenarios were selected from Liberman and Trope’s (1998) study on 
desirability and feasibility considerations. In addition to repeating their design, the same 
scenarios were given to a group of “advisors”. The prediction is that advisors make choices 
more similar to the far future decision makers than to the near future decision makers. In a 
similar way, two scenarios were selected from the research literature on advice giving (Kray 
& Gonzalez, 1999; Stone & Allgaier, in press), where people have been found to make 
different choices for others than for themselves. By presenting two scenarios from CLT 
tradition and two scenarios from the advice tradition in the same design, we expect to find a 
difference between advisors choices and decision makers choices, and in addition, a 
difference between the choices people make for themselves in the near and the far future. 
Again, the prediction is that the difference in choices between advisors and far future decision 
makers is smaller than the difference in choices between advisors and near future decision 
makers.  
 In addition, we ask what reasons people consider important when making choices for 
themselves and when giving advice. Such reasons can either reflect more immediate, practical 
considerations (“feasibility”), or more general goals (“desirability”), as suggested by the CLT. 
For each decision, 2 or 3 relevant considerations were selected and classified as feasibility or 
desirability reasons. Again, we predict that advisors will be less concerned with feasibility 
aspects compared to the decision makers, especially when the decisions concern events in the 
present or in the near future.  
Finally, we explored confidence levels. Overconfidence has often been found in 
research conducted on confidence in judgment and decision making literature (e.g., Dunning, 
Griffin, Milojkovic & Ross, 1990). Little research has explicitly investigated confidence in 
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advice literature, but findings in construal research indicate more confidence when predicting 
distant future outcome rather than near future outcome (Nussbaum, Liberman & Trope, 2006). 
Perhaps confidence in choices will be more pronounced when participants give advice, and be 
more similar to confidence in own decisions in far future than in near future. However, 
confidence in choice tasks (as used in the present study) might differ from confidence in 
judgment tasks. Klayman, Soll, Gonzalez-Vallejo and Barlas (1999) suggest that 
overconfidence is more likely in judgment than in choice tasks, hence, making it difficult to 
predict a particular pattern of result in the present study.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were 226 undergraduate psychology students at the University of Oslo (171 
women and 51 men, 4 did not indicate gender), with mean age of 23.2 years. They were 
randomly allocated to three different conditions by receiving three different versions of the 
same basic questionnaire.  
 
Materials  
All participants received a questionnaire describing four decision-making scenarios. Of these 
the first two from the temporal construal research (Trope & Liberman, 1998, study 3) and the 
remaining two from the advice-giving research. Scenario 3 was adapted from a study of Kray 
and Gonzalez (1999) and scenario 4 was adapted from Stone and Allgaier (in press, a similar 
scenario also used in Beisswanger et al., 2003).  
As in study 1, participants were asked to choose one of two options. 
Lecture scenario. In the first scenario, the decision maker is a student who is 
recommended by the teacher to attend a lecture held by a guest lecturer at an inconvenient 
time. Should the lecture be attended (desirability) or not (feasibility)?  
Sofa scenario. In the second scenario, the decision maker is moving into a new 
apartment and is in need of a sofa. The decision maker is offered a second hand sofa from a 
friend. The design is not perfect, but the giver offers to deliver the sofa. Should the offer be 
accepted (feasibility) or rejected (desirability)? 
Job scenario. In the third scenario, the decision maker has just finished school, and is 
offered two different jobs. One job is in accordance with his or her education and with a high 
salary. In the other job, the education is irrelevant and the salary is low, but the job is more 
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fulfilling and in line with the decision maker’s interests. Which job offer should be chosen, 
the well paid one and the one educated for (lower valued dimension) or the one interested in 
(more highly valued dimension)? 
Party scenario. In the fourth scenario, the decision maker spots an attractive person at 
a party, and has to decide whether to introduce oneself (risky option) or just stay with friends 
(safe option)? (For a detailed description of the scenarios, see Appendix B).   
 
Participants in Condition 1 (self, near-future) were asked to imagine themselves as 
actors and the situation as happening in the near future. In Condition 2 (self, distant- future), 
participants were also asked to imagine themselves as actors, but the situations were described 
to happen at some point in the future. In Condition 3 (other-advice), the participants were 
imagining themselves as advisors and asked to give advice to another person (of the same age 
and sex) facing the same choices.  
 
After each scenario, participants were asked to rate, on scales from 1 (totally 
unimportant) to 10 (very important), the importance of selected feasibility (F) and desirability 
(D) considerations. The attributes to be rated were: 
Lecture scenario:  Importance of Thematic relevance (D), Convenient time (F) 
Sofa scenario: Importance of Attractive design (D), Free delivery (F) 
Job offer: Salary (F), Importance of Work satisfaction (D), Convenient commuting (F) 
Party scenario: Importance of Making a try (D), Risk rejection (F), Stick to friends(F). 
 
After the importance-ratings, participants were asked to choose between the two options, 
where one can be regarded as ideally more desirable (on a higher construal level), and the 
other as more feasible or convenient from a practical point of view. Finally, participants were 
asked to rate, on scales ranging from 1(totally uncertain) to 10 (very certain), how confident 
they were in having made the best choice.  
 
Results 
 
Desirability vs. Feasibility Preferences  
Each decision contained a choice between one more ideally desirable and one more feasible 
and “safe” option. Choices of the desirable option received a score of 1 and the feasible 
option, a score of 0. Aggregated scores for each participant were computed by adding the 
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scores from each of the 4 scenarios. Thus, a score of 4 indicated that the participant always 
chose the ideally desirable option. Figure 2 shows that desirability choices were least frequent 
in Condition 1, where the decision had to take place in near future, and most frequent in 
Condition 3 (advice), with Condition 2 (distant future) in between. A one-way ANOVA 
confirms that the mean numbers of desirability choices are significantly different in the three 
conditions, F(2,223)= 27.58, p< .001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Condition 1          Condition 2         Condition 3  
 
Figure 2. Mean number of desirable choices for self and others in four situations. Experiment 2.  
 
A closer look at the separate scenarios (displayed in Table 3) shows the same pattern. When 
examining differences in choices in Condition 1 and 3 (near future decisions vs. advice to 
others), more desirability choices appeared in both the job and party scenarios from the advice 
tradition, replicating the results of both Kray and Gonzalez (1999) and Stone and Allgaier 
(2006; also Beisswanger et al.,2003). This was confirmed by Chi-square tests: job, χ2(1, N= 
154)= 3.13, p= .049; party, χ2(1, N=151)=33.60, p< .001. Additionally, more desirability 
choices were made in the lecture scenario from the CLT tradition, χ2(1, N=153)=20.06, p< 
.001. However, different results appeared in the sofa scenario from the other scenarios. 
Participants in the advice condition made more feasibility than desirability choices, producing 
an opposite pattern of results compared to the other scenarios, χ2(1, N=150)= 8.68, p= .003. 
 An increase in desirability choices was also apparent with temporal distance (see 
Table 3), but when analysing these differences separately for each scenario, none of them 
reached a significant level. Thus, Liberman and Trope’s (1998) results of more desirability 
choices with temporal distance in the lecture and sofa scenario were replicated, but without 
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reaching significance. Posts hoc tests (Tukey) show, however, that the sumscores for near and 
distant future, reported in Figure 2, are significantly different at the p<.001 level.  
 
Table 3.   
Percentages of participants choosing the most “desirable” option. Experiment 2. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
  Condition 1  Condition 2  Condition 3   
Scenario Actor near-future Actor distant-future Advice 
  (n = 75)   (n=72)   (n=79) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Lecture  49.3   59.7   83.5 
Sofa  34.7   45.8   21.5    
Job  73.3   80.6   86.1  
Party  49.3   59.7   98.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Total  51.7   61.5   72.5 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
 
Certainty ratings 
Participants seemed to be quite confident in their choices, regardless of making near or distant 
future decisions or if advising others. Summing up all situations, quite similar certainty scores 
were obtained, with means of respectively 6.75 and 6.82 for personal decisions in near and 
distant future, and 6.93 for advice giving. However, participants were more certain when 
more desirability choices (2-4) were made, rather than few desirability choices (0-1), with 
mean certainty ratings of 6.95 (more desirability choices) and 6.17 (few desirability choices), 
t(223)= 3,51, p< .001.  
 
Desirability and Feasibility Considerations 
As in the research design of Liberman and Trope (1998), participants rated the importance of 
desirability and feasibility considerations. However, in the present study participants scored 
feasibility and desirability considerations in scenarios from both CLT and advice tradition. 
Desirability scores (4 variables) and feasibility scores (6 variables) for all 4 scenarios were 
summed up and means computed (see table 4).  
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 Table 4.  
Mean importance ratings of desirability vs. feasibility considerations (four scenarios).  Experiment 2 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
   Condition 1  Condition 2  Condition 3 
Considerations  Self near-future  Self distant-future Other advice  
        (n=75)       (n=72)       (n=79) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
        
Desirable        7.38                     7.62        7.63 
Feasible        6.37         6.21        5.19 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Mean feasibility scores are computed from all six feasibility attributes. 
  
Similar to Liberman and Trope (1998), we first conducted a Consideration (feasibility 
vs. desirability) X Distance (self near vs. self distant future) mixed ANOVA with 
consideration as within-subjects variable and temporal distance as between-subjects variable. 
Additionally, we conducted the same analysis with Self vs. Advice (Condition 1 vs. Condition 
2) as the between subjects variable. 
The first analysis replicated one main effect in Liberman and Trope’s results, 
demonstrating (see Table 4) that desirability considerations were perceived more important 
than feasibility considerations both in near and distant future, F(1, 144)=108.29, p< .001. 
However, little difference in preference was observed between near and distant future 
conditions, thus no main effect of distance was obtained, F(1, 144)= .097, ns. Even though 
pattern of results indicated that desirability considerations marginally increased and feasibility 
considerations decreased with temporal distance, the interaction effect, which was obtained by 
Liberman and Trope, was not significant in the present study, F(1,144)=2.70, ns. 
More interestingly, the analysis of Consideration (feasibility vs. desirability) X 
Distance (self near distance vs. other-advice) mixed ANOVA, revealed similar results to 
Liberman and Trope’s observations in near and distant future (see Table 4). The analysis 
confirm that desirability considerations were perceived more important than feasibility 
considerations, both in the near future and in the advice condition, F (1, 151) =205.82, p< 
.001, similarly as observed with temporal distance. Further, feasibility considerations were 
scored more important in the near future condition than in the advice condition, F (1, 151) = 
9.06, p=.003. Moreover, the analysis demonstrated a Consideration x Distance interaction, F 
(1, 151) = 34.87, p< .001. This confirm the pattern shown in Table 4, where desirability 
considerations marginally were scored more important in the advice condition, while 
feasibility considerations were scored less important in the advice condition. 
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In order to see if a similar pattern of results emerged in scenarios from CLT and 
advice tradition, as predicted, separate Consideration (feasibility vs. desirability) X  Distance 
(near future vs. advice) ANOVAs were performed for each of the scenarios. The analysis of 
considerations in Condition 1 and 3 revealed significant interactions in both of the scenarios 
from the advice tradition (job and party), and one from CLT (lecture): lecture, F(1,152)= 
5.22, p= .024; job, F(1,152)= 6.72, p= .002; party, F(1,151)=28.25, p< .001. The exception 
was the sofa scenario, which might need to be seen in connection with results of choices.  
Similar as for the advice Condition, separate Consideration (feasibility vs. desirability) X 
Distance (near future vs. advice) ANOVAs were conducted for each scenarios to test temporal 
distance. However, only the sofa scenario reached a significant interaction F(1,145)=10.38, 
p= .002, replicating the result of Liberman and Trope (1998). Although only marginally 
significant, the result from the job scenario is worth mentioning, coming from the self-other 
tradition, F(1,145)= 2.58, p= .079.  
 
Discussion 
As predicted, more desirability choices were made in the advice condition than in the personal 
condition, and more desirability choices were made in the distant future condition rather than 
in the near future condition. Similar pattern of results were obtained in scenarios from both 
the CLT and advice tradition. We believe this indicates that some similarities in 
representation of the decision problem take place when giving advice and when making 
temporal distant decisions, supporting our proposal that advice giving represents a 
psychological distance to a decision problem, as for temporal distance. Moreover, the 
observed differences in preference are more conspicuous in the advice condition, therein more 
desirability choices are made and feasibility considerations are least valued in the advice 
condition. This could indicate that the psychological distance is greater when giving advice 
than when making temporal distant decisions.  These results are consistent with CLT, which 
suggest that feasibility considerations are less valued with psychological distance, and that the 
superordinate value (desirability) is superordinate regardless of distance  
However, participants’ preferences in the sofa scenario differed in the advice 
condition. Less desirability choices were made and feasibility considerations were more 
valued compared with the other scenarios. Actually, advisors’ chose to accept the sofa more 
often than near future decision makers, thus advisors preferences were more similar to 
personal preferences in the near future rather than preferences in the distant future. This 
suggest that even though psychological distance, in form of distant future decision making or 
- 23 - 
advice giving, seem to result in similar preferences in many situations, this is not the case in 
all situations. After all, decision makers and advisors are different persons, with their own 
personal taste. 
 
Experiment 3 
 
The second main agenda with the present work was to explore the advisor’s and the decision 
maker’s responsibility for the decision. Surprisingly little research within this area has been 
conducted before, thus little knowledge has been acquired on advice and responsibility. 
Results from experiment 1 demonstrated that although advisors perceive decision maker most 
responsible, advisor does take some responsibility for the decision, which suggest that advice 
utilization might be useful if decision makers seek to share responsibility (Harvey and 
Fischer, 1997). Moreover, perhaps the decision maker’s feeling of less responsibility when 
following advice, which was suggested by Promberger & Baron (2006), might be legitimate. 
Still the decision makers’ responsibility remained very high, suggesting that “shared” 
responsibility does not mean reduced responsibility. However, participants in experiment 1 
were only asked about their own responsibility as advisors (in Conditions 3 and 4), thus the 
research design of experiment 1 did not reveal any information of decision maker’s perception 
of responsibility.  
The primary objectives for experiment 3 were dual. The first objective was to explore 
how advisor’s and decision maker’s responsibility was perceived, both from the perspective 
of the decision maker (actor) and the advice giver. We expected decision makers to be 
perceived far the most responsible, both by decision makers and advisors. Additionally, we 
also found it likely that advisor was perceived to have some responsibility for the decision.  
The second objective of experiment 3 was to explore perceived responsibility and 
consequences. The research of LeBoeuf and Norton (2006) demonstrate how consequences 
influence the perception causes. Participants in their study perceived big negative outcomes to 
have “big” negative causes, whereas small negative outcomes were due to “small” negative 
causes. We sought to ascertain whether perception of responsibility was constant or if the 
perception varies with knowledge of a negative decision outcome, and further, whether 
responsibility varies with regard to the outcome being moderate or severe. We could imagine 
different outcomes of this study. From LeBoeuf and Norton’s observations, participants in the 
role of both advisors and decision makers would be expected to perceive responsibility to 
increase with knowledge of negative outcome, and even more so with knowledge of severe 
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outcome. However, attribution research (Snyder & Higgins, 1988) has shown that people 
often ascribe their own success to internal personal factors, such as ability, and their failures 
to external situational causes, such as bad luck. According to this “self-serving bias”, one 
might expect decision makers to perceive advisors responsibility as particularly high 
following a negative outcome, a result which might be more pronounced when negative 
outcome is severe. We would also expect people as advisors to blame the decision makers and 
not themselves.  
To sum up, we had three main questions: Did actors and advisors agree upon how 
much responsibility each of them had? Were there any differences in perceived responsibility 
when negative consequences were known rather than unknown? Finally, were there any 
differences in perceived responsibility with regard to the level of outcome severity?  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were 245 undergraduate psychology students at the University of Oslo (173 
women and 68 men, 4 did not indicate gender), with mean age of 23.3 years. They were 
randomly allocated to six different conditions by receiving six different versions of the same 
basic questionnaire.  
 
Materials  
All participants received a questionnaire describing four decision making scenarios, but 
unlike both in study 1 and 2, the scenarios in this study presented a decision that had already 
been taken. Consequently, no choices were to be made by the participants. In all four 
scenarios, the decision maker received an advice from a trusted friend before making the 
decision, which then was made according to the advice.  
 
Book scenario. The first scenario described a situation where a student  had to make a 
choice between reading superficially both books on the curriculum for an exam or take a 
chance and study just one of them more thoroughly. Time was limited, and the decision maker 
was advised by a fellow student (who had already persuaded some other students) to 
concentrate on one book and skip the other.  
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Drunk-driving scenario. In the second scenario, the decision maker was at a party. As 
the party members did not make it to the bus, the decision maker was persuaded to drive, even  
after having drunk alcohol. 
Co-author scenario. In the third scenario, a choice had to be made whether the 
decision maker should become a co-author on a research article. The decision maker was 
persuaded to be listed as a co-author, despite having made only a minor contribution to the 
article 
Employment scenario. In the fourth scenario, the participant was a student 
representative on a university board. An employment decision had to be made between two 
candidates (one young and promising and one more experienced) for a position as a professor 
at the university. The decision maker was advised to choose the promising one (for a detailed 
description of the scenarios, see Appendix C). 
 
Altogether 6 conditions were employed in this study, forming a 2 x 3 design with 
actor/advisor as one factor and three levels of outcome information as the other factor.   
In Condition 1-3, participants were asked to imagine themselves as actors, being the 
personal decision makers who receive advice (advice-takers) from a trusted friend.   
In Condition 4-6, participants were instead asked to place themselves in the role of 
advisors, providing the advice upon which the personal decision makers based their decisions 
upon (advice-givers).  
 
The conditions also differed in information about consequences. In Conditions 1 (advice-
taker, no outcome) and 4 (advice-giver, no outcome), no outcome information was provided. 
In Conditions 2 (advice-taker, moderately negative) and 5 (advice-giver, moderately 
negative), moderately negative consequences were disclosed: 
     Book scenario. The decision maker received a question from the book that was 
skipped and did less well on the exam than his/her potential, but was still allowed to proceed 
with the studies. 
Driving scenario. The decision maker was stopped in a police control and received a 
ticket for drunk driving. 
Co-author scenario.It was disclosed that the main researcher had cheated and the 
article was based on fabricated data. However, the decision maker being just a co-author, 
received little negative publicity. 
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Employment scenario. The chosen candidate proved not to be a successful teacher, and 
one would think that other candidate would have been a better choice.  
  
In Conditions 3 (advice-taker, negative) and 6 (advice-giver, negative), the decisions led to 
more severe consequences.   
     Book scenario. The decision maker failed the exam and was not allowed to proceed 
with the studies. 
 Drunk-driving scenario. The decision maker was stopped in a police control and was 
convicted for drunk driving (having to serve time in jail).  
 Co-author scenario. The decision maker, being a co-author received a lot of negative 
attention. Difficulties arouse both in private life and also interfering with her academic career.   
 Employment scenario. The chosen candidate proved to be a disaster. Everyone agreed 
that it would have been much better to have chosen the other candidate.  
 
After being presented with each scenario, participants were asked to rate how much 
responsibility they regarded the advisor to have for the decision, and also how much 
responsibility they regarded the personal decision maker to have for the decision. In scenario 
1 and 2, the responsibility of the other students (or partygoers) was also rated.  All 
responsibility ratings were done by circling a number on a percentage scale from 0 (not 
responsible at all) to 100% (completely responsible). 
 
Results 
 
Participants were presented for four scenarios. Decision makers’ (actors) scores of 
respectively advisor’s and decision maker’s responsibility, and advisors’ scores of 
respectively advisor’s and decision maker’s responsibility, were averaged over 4 scenarios. 
Table 5 shows the total mean responsibility ratings for both the decision maker and the 
advisor, as made by decision makers (self as decision maker) and advisors (self as advisor). 
The total scores demonstrate clearly a main effect of decision makers responsibility. Both 
decision makers themselves and advisors perceived the decision maker as much more 
responsible than the advisors. In the following, the responsibility of actor (decision maker) 
and advisor will be discussed separately.   
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Table 5.  Mean ratings of perceived responsibility averaged over 4 scenarios. Experiment 3. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
     Conditions 1-3    Conditions 4-6 
 Self as decision maker (actor)                            Self as advisor  
    _________________________      ____________________________ 
Decision-outcome  Self-Actor    Other-Advisor   n      Other-Actor    Self- Advisor       n 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Unknown                 82.5          30.3         53        88.1     37.9                   54 
 
Known       89.7         22.1                 70          87.6               30.9                   65 
 
        - Moderately negative  90.5          25.3         31        87.4     27.6                    35 
        - Severely negative             88.8          19.6           39        87.4     35.1                    30 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Total    86.5          25.7               87.8     34.2                   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  
 
Decision makers’ Responsibility as Perceived by Decision Makers and Advisors 
The perception of decision makers’ responsibility did not appear to differ much across 
conditions (see table 5). The decision makers’ responsibility scores are in the high end of the 
scale, both when scored by decision makers themselves and by advisors, the small differences 
observed between the conditions might be due to a ceiling effect. However, interestingly, a 2 
(Perspective: decision maker vs. advisor) x 2 (Outcome knowledge: unknown vs. known) 
ANOVA, with decision maker’s responsibility as dependent variable, demonstrate a 
Perspective x Outcome knowledge interaction, F(1, 242)= 4.60, p= .033. This interaction 
indicate that decision makers perceive their own responsibility to increase with knowledge of 
decision outcome, which was confirmed by a one-way ANOVA F(1,122)= 8.13, p= .005. 
While advisors, on the other hand, only perceive their own responsibility to marginally 
decrease, F(1,119)= .12, ns.  
However, a 2 x 2 ANOVA on decision maker’s responsibility with knowledge of a 
moderate and severe decision outcome, demonstrate that level of outcome knowledge 
(moderately or severely negative) neither had impact on decision maker’s perception of 
responsibility, nor on advisor’s perception of responsibility.  
 
Advisors’ Responsibility as Perceived by Decision Makers and Advisors 
Means of advisor responsibility displayed in Table 5, show that advisors perceive themselves 
more responsible for the decision than they were perceived by decision makers. Further, a 
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somewhat different pattern of responsibility scores are displayed across levels of decision-
outcome.  
A two-way ANOVA was performed, with Perspective (advisor vs. actor) x Outcome-
knowledge (unknown vs. known) as independent variables, and advisor responsibility as 
dependent variable. The analysis confirm that advisors perceive themselves more responsible 
with knowledge of outcome than they are perceived by decision makers, F(1, 241)= 9.42, p= 
.002. Additionally, advisors and decision makers perceive advisor less responsible with 
knowledge of outcome rather than when having no knowledge, with means of respectively 
26.5 and 34.1, F(1,241)= 8.75, p= .003. However, no perspective x outcome-knowledge 
interaction was demonstrated, F(1, 241)= .066, ns. 
Additionally, perceived advisor’s responsibility with knowledge of level of negative 
outcome was examined. A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with Perspective (advisor vs. actor) 
x Level of severity (moderate vs. sever) as independent variables and advisor responsibility as 
dependent variable. Again, the analysis confirmed that advisors perceived their own 
responsibility to exceed the decision maker’s perception of responsibility, F(1,133)= 6.71, p= 
.011. No main effect of level of negative outcome was demonstrated, F(1,133)= .42, ns. 
However, a Perspective x Level of severity interaction was confirmed, F(1,133)= 4.19, p= 
.043. As visualized in Table 5, this interaction indicate that advisors perceive themselves 
more responsible with knowledge of a severe decision outcome, while decision makers, on the 
other hand, perceive advisor even less responsible with knowledge of severe decision 
outcome.  
 
The Responsibility of a Group as Perceived by Decision Makers and Advisors 
Two scenarios contained, in addition to decision maker and advisor, a group of others who 
sided with the advisor in recommending one of the options (driving after drinking in the 
Driving scenario, and focusing on one book in the Book scenario). These groups were also 
perceived to have some responsibility. In fact, they were perceived as somewhat more 
responsible than advisors. This was confirmed by a 2 x 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, 
with Perspective (actor vs. advisor) x Level (unknown vs. moderate vs. severe) x Target 
(group vs. advisor). Perspective and Level were between-group variables and Target was 
within-group variable. A main effect of Target was demonstrated, F(1, 236)= 14.30, p< .001, 
confirming that the groups present were perceived more responsible than advisors (with 
means of respectively 37.8 and 32.9). Moreover, a main effect of Perspective was 
demonstrated between-groups, F (1, 236) = 21.37, p< .001, confirming that the decision 
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maker (self as actor) gave less responsibility to the other group than given by advisor (with 
means of respectively 27.8 and 43). Neither Level nor any interactions were demonstrated to 
differ significantly.  
 
Individual Difference in Perception of Responsibility 
Similarly to observations in study 1, participants seemed to employ different decision rules 
when rating responsibility. Approximately 40% of the participants were very particular in not 
exceeding a total of 100% responsibility (14% perceived actor all responsible while actor not 
at all responsible), whereas 55% produced ratings that added up to more than 100%. A few 
participants (5%) gave a total of less than 100%. However, the tendency of using these rules 
varied with perspective (actor or advisor). Twenty percent of actors against only 8% of 
advisors perceived actor as totally responsible (100%) and advisor not at all responsible.  
 
Discussion 
These results suggest that knowledge of outcome seem to have effect on perception of 
responsibility, as predicted from LeBeouf and Norton’s (2006) observations of magnitude 
matching of cause and consequences. However, differences where observed between decision 
maker’s perception and advisor’s perception of responsibility with knowledge of 
consequences. While decision makers and advisors agreed upon the total amount of 
responsibility that lay upon the decision maker, they disagreed upon the responsibility that lay 
upon the advisor, but not in the direction predicted by the self-serving bias (Snyder & 
Higgins, 1988). Rather, with knowledge of a negative outcome, decision makers perceived 
their own responsibility to increase while they perceived the advisor’s responsibility to 
decrease. Further, decision makers perceived advisors to have less responsibility than advisors 
perceived themselves to have. With knowledge of a moderately negative outcome, advisors 
perceived their own responsibility to be less than with no knowledge of outcome, however, 
with knowledge of a severely negative outcome, the advisors perceived their own 
responsibility to be increased (back to the level with no outcome knowledge).   
Promberger and Baron (2006) suggest that decision makers feel less responsible after 
taking advice. In the present study, differences in responsibility were observed across 
conditions. However, decision makers’ responsibility remained very high, both when 
perceived by decision makers’ themselves and by advisors’. This indicates that although some 
responsibility is given to advisors in addition to decision makers, shared responsibility does 
not necessarily mean reduced responsibility. Further, individual differences in perception of 
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responsibility were observed. A substantial part of the participants perceived decision makers 
fully responsible regardless of the situation, and participants in the role of decision makers 
even more so than advisors. Hence, decision makers does not seem to regard advice as a mean 
to share responsibility on a general basis, as proposed by Harvey and Fischer (1997).  
 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
Difference in Perspective and Difference in Preference: Experiment 1 and 2 
 
In two experiments, it was found that the advices people give to others differ systematically 
from the decisions they make for themselves. This difference seems, as anticipated, to be 
smaller between advice giving situations and personal decisions with temporal distance. 
Consistent with our main prediction, results from Experiment 1 demonstrated that participants 
recommended more action choices when giving advice, and they made more action choices 
for themselves in distant future rather than in near future, although only for low-impact 
situations. Results from Experiment 2 demonstrated that participants made more desirability 
choices in three out of four situations when giving advice, and also that more desirability 
choices were made in distant future than in near future. Moreover, participants were found to 
value feasibility considerations less important in three out of four situations when giving 
advice. Desirability considerations were more valued than feasibility considerations in all 
conditions.  
These results suggest that people who give advice and make distant future decisions, 
represent decision problems differently than people who make more immediate decisions. It 
appears to be some similarities between giving advice and making distant future decisions, 
which perhaps could be counted for by construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 2003). The 
differences in people’s preferences when providing advice and when making distant future 
decisions, might be due to a psychological distance from the decision situation.  
 
Positive and Negative Consequences 
The observed tendency of making more action and desirable choices when having a 
psychological distance to the decision problem, might be due to less focus on the negative 
prospects of a decision outcome. Beisswanger et al. (2003) found that people deciding for 
themselves were particular focused on negative reasons rather than on positive ones, while 
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people advising others were less focused on possible negative decision outcomes. Eyal et al. 
(2004) found people to consider more pro argument when thinking about distant future 
activities than near future activities.  
Tory Higgins (e.g. Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 2000a; Higgins, 2000b; Higgins, 
2002; Molden & Higgins, 2005) promote a motivation theory, in which people have a 
promotion or a prevention focus. The promotion focus is concerned with advancement, 
growth and accomplishment, whereas prevention focus is concerned with security, safety and 
responsibility. A promotion focus might be more prevalent when people have a distance to a 
decision task, either in form of temporal or advice giving, in which one is more concerned 
with the positive aspects like attaining possible gains. Prevention focus, on the other hand, 
might be more prevalent in near future decision making, in which primary focus is more 
likely in order to avoid negative outcome, thus a more cautious consideration of both positive 
and negative aspects of the situation is needed. Consequently, advisors and far future decision 
makers might be more inclined to make approach choices, whereas immediate decision 
makers might be more prone to abstain from them.  
This is in line with Tversky and Kahneman’s  (1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
prospect theory, where two phases are distinguished in the choice process, an initial phase, in 
which acts, outcomes and contingencies are edited or framed, and a subsequent phase of 
evaluation. Evaluation of prospects differs with different framing of the decision problem. 
They propose that people evaluate acts in terms of a minimal account (which includes only 
the direct consequences of the act) or a more inclusive account (more aspects are considered). 
When people have the perspective of advisors or as distant future decision makers, they might 
be more likely to evaluate a decision option in a minimal account, mainly considering the core 
features (possible gains). When people have the perspective of near future decision makers, 
on the other hand, they might be more inclined to evaluate the acts in a more inclusive 
account, considering more of the negative aspects in addition to the positive ones (possible 
losses). As pointed out by Tversky and Kahneman, when one is considering more aspects of a 
decision situation, the concurrent balance in a possible decision outcome might be negative.   
This has some similarities to both CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2003) and the “change in 
the weighting of dimensions” framework forwarded by Kray and Gonzales (1999), in which 
both suggests that more aspects of a decision situation are valued when personal decisions are 
made (in the near future), whereas the most important aspects are given most value in the 
distant future (CLT), or when giving advice. However, Kray and Gonzale’s framework 
propose that advisors consider the same amount of information as personal decision makers, 
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but they give more weight to the most important attribute. CLT, on the other hand, suggest 
that when people have psychological distance from a decision task, information is represented 
in such way that the most important dimensions are more available. 
 
Weighting of Dimensions Framework and CLT – Is It the Same?  
Liberman and Trope (1998) found desirability considerations (the value of an actions end 
state) to be superordinate to feasibility considerations (practical considerations), both in near 
and distant future, whereas feasibility considerations were considered less important with 
temporal distance. Similarly, Kray and Gonzalez (1999) found the most highly valued 
dimension to stay most important, both when making personal choices and when giving 
advice, whereas the lower valued dimension were given less weight when providing advice.  
However, Kray and Gonzales found the most highly valued dimension not to change weight 
across conditions and argue that this provide support for their proposal that a difference in 
weighting (of lower valued dimension), rather than a shift in value, is the reason for the 
observed difference in preferences. Liberman and Trope, on the other hand, found people to 
value desirability considerations more important in the distant future, in addition to giving 
less value to feasibility considerations, which they argue provide support for their proposition 
that a shift in value takes place. In Experiment 2, results demonstrate that participants 
regarded the feasible aspects less important when providing advice and also when making 
distant future decisions, whereas they regarded the desirable aspects marginally more 
important both when making distant future decisions and when giving advice. These results 
suggest that there are some similarities in how the different aspects are valued, both when 
comparing advice vs. self-choice conditions and when comparing near vs. distant future 
conditions. However, we recognize that further research need to be done in order to 
disentangle whether reasons for the observed differences in preferences are due to a shift in 
value with different perspective, or difference in weighting of value.    
 
Decision Quality 
Although we have found participants systematically to make more action choices and more 
desirable choices, both with temporal distance and when giving advice, it is important to note 
that we did not study decision quality.  Different perspectives on a decision problem are found 
to promote different preferences, but no knowledge is obtained on which perspective that 
might increase the likelihood of making the most optimal decisions.   
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 One perspective is not likely to be superior to others in making the best decisions in all 
situations. Rather, one perspective is likely to promote more correct decisions in some 
situations, while other perspectives are likely to promote better decisions in other situations. 
In the vacation scenario (experiment 1), advisors and far future decision makers (next year) 
were more inclined to choose to go on vacation in the middle of the semester than decision 
makers with little temporal distance (this year). It is possible that near future decision makers, 
in fact, made a better decision in order to do well on the forthcoming exam. Advisors and far 
future decision makers might have failed to consider the contextual considerations of how 
long it takes to prepare on each topic relevant for the exam, hence making a planning fallacy 
(Buehler & Ross, 1994). In the party scenario, on the other hand, it is possible that the 
advisors made the best choice of taking the risk of introducing oneself, because the downside 
of the decision was only temporarily (humiliation of being turned down). Only one participant 
advised the decision maker not to introduce him or herself, which demonstrate that advisors 
very much agreed upon making this choice, whereas only half of the immediate decision 
makers chose to introduce themselves.  
  
Implications 
 However, some implications do arise in using CLT as a general explanation for 
differences observed with psychological distance. The current results demonstrate that 
situational differences might occur in advisor preference and personal preference in the future. 
Same pattern of preference was observed for both advice givers and far future decision 
makers in all scenarios, except in the sofa scenario (experiment 2). Although the recipient of 
the sofa was not very fond of the design, advisors recommended acceptance of the sofa more 
often than personal decision makers (both with and without temporal distance). Personal 
decision makers, on the other hand, were more likely to reject the sofa in the distant future 
than in the near future (Trope and Liberman, 1998). 
 Braithwaite and Scott (1991, as cited in Rohan, 2000) emphasise that personal value-
priorities have to do with the desired, or what people want, rather than with the desirable, or 
what people ought to do. This suggests that there are situations where the desired and the 
“desirable “, the more normatively correct thing to do, are not the same. The sofa scenario 
differed from the other scenarios in that the desired option (an attractive sofa) was tied to 
personal taste, and as we know, personal taste differs among different people. Advisors do 
probably not relate to others’ personal tastes in a similar way as people relate to their own 
taste with temporal distance. Most likely are other people’s tastes less available for the 
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advisors, while practical considerations, on the other hand, like the hassle of moving a sofa, 
are more available. Moreover, the sofa is offered to the decision maker for free, perhaps the 
advisor is following some norm where “one ought to accept a perfectly good sofa when 
offered to you”, and especially in the case of a young student with little money available. 
Besides, the advisor is not the one having to live with the unwanted sofa.  
 
Limitations and Future Directions for Advice Giving as Psychological Distance  
The present approach has some limitations. The scenarios were hypothetical, but on the 
positive side, there are reasons to believe that the differences in psychological distance would 
have an even stronger influence on responses in real-live situations, especially in the personal 
decision making conditions (near and distant future).  
We did not study decision quality, and hence cannot tell which choices that would 
have been the best for the decision maker. Although advisor’s and decision maker’s accuracy 
has received some attention in the advice taking research (e.g., Gardner & Berry, 1995; 
Sniezek, Schrah & Dalal, 2004; Yaniv, 1997, 2004a), these studies have used judgment tasks 
rather than choice tasks, thus making comparisons difficult. However, in our Experiment 3, 
we have studied decisions and advices with negative outcome, which consequently proved to 
be poor decisions and advices.   
 
Responsibility for Decision: Perceived by Advisor and Decision Maker 
 
The second main agenda with the present work was to explore the domain of responsibility. 
Decision makers’ and advisors’ responsibility was explored, as seen from the perspectives of 
both decision makers and advisors. Additionally, perceived responsibility was explored with 
and without knowledge of decision outcome.  
Results from both experiment 1 and 3 suggest that advisors take some responsibility 
for the decision made. However, results from experiment 3 suggests that there are 
discrepancies between advisors’ and decision makers’ perception of their own and the other’s 
responsibility. Although results suggest that decision makers and advisors agreed upon the 
decision maker’s responsibility (close to full responsibility), they disagreed upon the 
responsibility that lay upon the advisors’. Advisors perceived themselves to have more 
responsibility than the decision makers perceived them to have. Interestingly, decision makers 
perceived their own responsibility to increase with knowledge of a negative outcome, whereas 
they perceived advisors responsibility to decrease. Advisors, on the other hand, perceived 
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themselves just as responsible with no knowledge of outcome as with knowledge of a severe 
outcome, and further, they did not perceive decision makers responsibility to differ with 
knowledge of outcome.  
As predicted from LeBoeuf and Norton’s (2006) results of causality, the actors 
perceived their own responsibility to increase with knowledge of a negative outcome, and also 
advisors perceived their own responsibility to increase with knowledge of a severely negative 
outcome (but not exceeding their responsibility level with no knowledge of outcome).  To our 
knowledge, no previous research has been performed on perception or responsibility for 
decisions following advice taking. Hence, we have no ready explanation for the obtained 
differences in perceived responsibility, and can only offer speculations about why some of the 
results occur.  
LeBoeuf and Norton found the outcome-cause matching to be prevalent, and suggests 
that the “resemblances criterion” (Nisbett & Ross, 1980, cited in LeBoeuf  & Norton, 2006) 
might account for the observed matching. Presumably, a matching between magnitude of 
outcome and responsibility might take place. A similarity heuristic (Kahneman & Frederick, 
2003) might be used when making responsibility-judgments, in which knowledge of increased 
magnitude of consequences might promote a similar increase in perceived responsibility.  
Additionally, suggestions can be that the awareness of a negative outcome might cause 
the situation to become more vivid for the decision maker, in which more of the detailed, 
contextual aspects of the situation become more prominent, for example the fact that the 
decision maker has to face the consequences alone. Advisors are not faced with the 
consequences to the same extent as decision makers, advisors responsibility is limited to 
being blamed for providing poor advice. This awareness might also explain why decision 
makers actually perceives advisor to have less responsibility when having knowledge of the 
negative consequences. Knowledge of negative consequences might in fact promote a more 
realistic perception of responsibility for decision makers. Advisors’ perception of 
responsibility, on the other hand, does not to change accordingly to decision makers, which 
might indicate that the whole situation is more abstract to them. Advisors might even be 
following a decision making norm. They might feel that taking some responsibility is the right 
thing to do, since they actually made a contribution to the outcome in form of giving the 
advice.  
However, individual differences in perception of responsibility were observed, making 
general explanations less likely valid.  
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Limitations, Implications and Future Directions for Perceived Responsibility 
The present approach to investigate the responsibility of the advisor and decision maker has 
certain limitations. First, our design does not allow any conclusions to be drawn on whether 
decision makers are perceived less responsible when taking advice. We have no measures on 
perceived responsibility for the decision maker when no advice is taken. Although many 
participants did not perceive the decision maker to be fully responsible, we can only assume 
that the reason for this observed reduction in responsibility (from 100% when fully 
responsible) is caused by the decision maker’s utilization of advice. Second, the participants 
were young students. It is possible that samples from different populations might perceive 
responsibility differently. Moreover, it is plausible that cultural differences might appear in 
the perception of responsibility. Third, the scenarios were hypothetical. There are reasons to 
believe that responsibility might be perceived differently in real-life situations, when decision 
makers will have to live with the consequences of their decisions, and advisors with their 
conscience. 
The domain of responsibility is largely unexplored, and several interesting avenues of 
research could be followed in order to understand this phenomenon more completely. For 
example, we found a negative decision outcome to have an impact on decision makers’ 
perception of responsibility, but we have no knowledge of the impact of positive decision 
outcomes.  
Further, descriptive research show how people focus on decision outcome when 
evaluating the quality of a decision (Keren & Bruin, 2003). Responsibility for advisors’ and 
decision makers’ would be interesting to explore from the perspective of outside observers. 
The Outside observers are not accountable for any outcome, and would perhaps be more 
inclined to perceive the responsibility of both advisors and decision makers in wisdom of 
hindsight. 
Moreover, perhaps perceived responsibility differs with regard to expert level of 
advisors and decision makers respectively. Promberger and Baron (2006) found participants 
to feel less responsible for their decision after taking medical advice from doctors. Research 
within the advice taking division of the advice tradition, has found decision makers more 
likely to utilize advice from experts (e.g., Harvey & Fisher, 1997; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 
2004; Yaniv, 2004b; Yaniv& Kleinberger, 2000), to trust advice from experts more (e.g., 
Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005), and to be more confident when 
receiving advice from experts (eg., Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994). Perhaps perception of 
advisors’ and decision makers’ responsibility differs with regard to the relative level of 
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expertise of an advisor. For example, an advisor is perhaps perceived more responsible in 
cases like; a professor giving advice to a student, or a doctor giving advice to a patient, or a 
senior employee giving advice to a junior employee, rather than if the advisor is purely a 
friend with no more knowledge than the decision maker. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This work demonstrates that advisors preferences bear some similarity to personal distant 
future preferences. Thus, it is plausible that advice represents a psychological distance to the 
decision problem, similar as with temporal distance. CLT predicts that psychological distance 
to an event makes central features of the event more prominent and most value is given to 
superordinate goals, which offers a plausible explanation for advisors’ and distant future 
decision makers’ tendency to choose the more desirable options. However, advisors are found 
to make choices according to norms more than decision makers (eg., Stone & Allgaier, in 
press) There are situations where the desired and the desirable are not the same, hence where 
advisors and decision makers might make different choices due to the fact that they are 
different persons.  
The present work gives a contribution to knowledge of advisors’ and decision makers’ 
perception of responsibility for decisions. This could be a good starting point for further 
studies to obtain a more extensive understanding of the demonstrated phenomena. Phenomen 
such as: (1) the self-other differences in the responsibility of advisors; (2) the effects of 
outcome knowledge on perceived responsibility; and (3) whether responsibility can be shared 
without being reduced.   
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Appendix A  – Experiment 1  
 
   
       Beslutningstaking og rådgivning  
 
 
 
 
 
Dette spørreskjema er utarbeidet som en del av et forskningsprosjekt om rådgivning og 
beslutningstaking, som pågår ved Psykologisk institutt. Prosjektet inngår som en del av 
masteravhandling for Gro Hege Haraldsen Nordbye, under veiledning av Karl Halvor Teigen. 
Alle besvarelser er anonyme og vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. En kort rapport om 
undersøkelsen vil foreligge senere i semesteret, og kan fås ved å sende mail etter 1.november 
til ghnordby@student.sv.uio.no.  
 
 
 
 
Bakgrunnsopplysninger: 
 
 
Kjønn (sett ring rundt)  K M 
 
 
Alder     ……...................... år 
 
 
Studium/yrke   ………................... 
 
 
Hvor lenge har du studert?  ……………………år 
 
 
 
 
 
Nedenfor er det beskrevet tre ulike situasjoner der du må ta en beslutning på kort varsel. Prøv 
og lev deg inn i hver beslutningssituasjon så godt du kan, med de fordeler og ulemper som 
disse situasjonene innebærer for deg. 
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Situasjon 1 
 
 
Det er midt i semesteret og du er i full gang med studiene. En god venn tilbyr deg 
senere i dag å bli med på en ferietur i en uke til varmere strøk, med garantert sol 
og sommer. Vennen din har gode kontakter i reiselivsbransjen slik at du får 
turen svært billig. Du må bestemme deg raskt for om skal ta imot tilbudet, for 
reisen er allerede til neste uke.  
 
 
Tror du at du vil velge å reise? (Kryss av)     
 
Reise   Ikke reise  
  
     
Hvor vanskelig synes du beslutningen var? 
   
Veldig  lett          Veldig vanskelig 
     
         
Hvor sannsynlig er det at du ville søkt råd hos andre?  
  
Helt sikkert ikke         Helt sikkert  
 
 
Sett at du valgte å spørre en studievenn om råd, hvilket råd tror du ville vært mest  
sannsynlig å få? 
       
Reise   Ikke reise  
 
 
Hvilke grunner (for og imot) vurderte du når du tenkte på om du skulle reise eller ikke?  
 
• …………………………………………....…................................................................... 
• ……………………………………………………..……………………………………. 
• ………………………………………………………...………………………………… 
• …………………………………………………………………………………………... 
• …………………………………………………………………………………………... 
• …………………………………………………………………………………………... 
• ………………………………………………………....…............................................... 
• ………………………………………………………….……………………………….. 
• ……………………………………………………….………………………………….. 
• …………………………………………………………………………………………... 
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Situasjon 2 
 
Tenk deg at du i dag oppdager at du (eller din kjæreste) er gravid.  Du blir veldig 
overrasket da dette ikke er noe du har planlagt at skal skje nå. Du har nylig blitt 
kjæreste med din partner og det er fortsatt flere år igjen før du er ferdig med 
studiene dine. Du vet at du har mulighet til å velge abort. Dersom du (eller din 
kjæreste) ikke tar abort, vil livet ditt bli svært endret siden du kommer til å ha et 
barn innen dette studieåret er over.  
 
 
Tror du at du vil velge abort? (Kryss av) 
 
Abort   Ikke abort  
  
     
Hvor vanskelig synes du beslutningen var?  
   
Veldig  lett          Veldig vanskelig 
     
         
Hvor sannsynlig er det at du ville søkt råd hos andre?  
  
Helt sikkert ikke         Helt sikkert  
 
 
Sett at du valgte å spørre en studievenn om råd, hvilket råd tror du ville vært mest  
sannsynlig å få? 
       
Abort   Ikke abort  
 
 
Hvilke grunner (for og imot) vurderte du når du tenkte på om du (eller din kjæreste) 
skulle velge abort?   
 
• …………………………………………....…................................................................... 
• ……………………………………………………..……………………………………. 
• ………………………………………………………...………………………………… 
• …………………………………………………………………………………………... 
• …………………………………………………………………………………………... 
• …………………………………………………………………………………………... 
• ………………………………………………………....…............................................... 
• ………………………………………………………….……………………………….. 
• ……………………………………………………….………………………………….. 
• …………………………………………………………………………………………... 
- 47 - 
Situasjon 3 
 
 
Tenk deg at du har gjennomført tre år av et studieforløp som vil vare i fem år til 
sammen. Det er viktig å gjøre det bra på studiet, for det vil være konkurranse om 
jobbene etter at dere er ferdig utdannet. Du har jobbet hardt i disse tre årene og 
gjort det brukbart, men du gjorde det dårlig på siste eksamen. Du begynner å bli 
usikker på om dette er den rette utdannelsen for deg. Da kommer et 
overraskende og fristende tilbud om en god jobb innenfor et helt annet felt, der 
lønnen er god og det er gode fremtidsutsikter.  
 
 
Vil du slutte studiene og ta imot tilbudet? (Kryss av)  
  
        Ta imot tilbudet   Ikke ta imot tilbudet  
  
Hvor vanskelig synes du beslutningen var?  
   
Veldig  lett          Veldig vanskelig 
     
         
Hvor sannsynlig er det at du ville søkt råd hos andre?  
  
Helt sikkert ikke         Helt sikkert  
 
 
Sett at du valgte å spørre en studievenn om råd, hvilket råd tror du ville vært mest  
sannsynlig å få? 
       
  Ta imot tilbudet   Ikke ta imot tilbudet  
 
 
Hvilke grunner (for og imot) vurderte du når du tenkte på om du skulle ta imot  
jobbtilbudet?  
 
• …………………………………………....…................................................................... 
• ……………………………………………………..……………………………………. 
• ………………………………………………………...………………………………… 
• …………………………………………………………………………………………... 
• …………………………………………………………………………………………... 
• …………………………………………………………………………………………... 
• ………………………………………………………....…............................................... 
• ………………………………………………………….……………………………….. 
• ……………………………………………………….………………………………….. 
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Appendix B – Experiment 2 
 
Råd og beslutninger 
 
 
 
 
 
Dette spørreskjema er utarbeidet som en del av et forskningsprosjekt om rådgivning og 
beslutningstaking, som pågår ved Psykologisk institutt. Prosjektet inngår som en del av 
masteravhandling for Gro Hege Haraldsen Nordbye, under veiledning av Karl Halvor Teigen. 
Alle besvarelser er anonyme og vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. En kort rapport om 
undersøkelsen vil foreligge senere i semesteret. Eventuelle spørsmål kan rettes til 
ghnordby@student.sv.uio.no.  
 
 
 
 
 
Bakgrunnsopplysninger: 
 
 
Kjønn (sett ring rundt)   K   M 
 
 
Alder      .............. år 
 
 
Hvor lenge har du studert?   …………år 
 
 
Har du vært med på en lignende  
studie før? (sett ring rundt svaret)  Ja    Nei 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Du vil i dette spørreskjemaet få presentert 4 ulike situasjoner der du må ta stilling til noen 
spørsmål. Tenk deg at dette er situasjoner som du står overfor i dag. Sett deg godt inn i 
situasjonene og svar så godt du kan ut fra hvordan situasjonene er beskrevet og den personen 
du selv er. 
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Situasjon 1. 
 
Du er på psykologisk institutt og får vite at en gjesteforelesning vil bli avholdt i 
dag. Du blir anbefalt av en lærer å gå på denne forelesningen, og du tror at 
forelesningen både kan være interessant og nyttig for fremtidig arbeid.  
 
 
Hvor viktig er det for deg at: 
 
forelesningen er faglig relevant? (sett ring rundt svaret) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
(Helt uviktig)         (veldig viktig) 
 
   
forelesningen holdes på et praktisk tidspunkt?  (sett ring rundt svaret) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
(helt uviktig)         (veldig viktig) 
 
 
Det viser seg at forelesningen avholdes kl 18.00, noe som betyr at du må tilbake til 
instituttet etter middag. Tror du at du vil velge å gå på forelesningen? (kryss av) 
 
       
 Gå på forelesning   
Ikke gå på forelesning    
 
 
Hvor sikker er du på at dette er det riktige valget? (sett ring rundt svaret) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
(helt usikker)         (helt sikker) 
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Situasjon 2 
 
 
Du skal flytte inn i en ny leilighet i morgen og trenger en sofa. En bekjent tilbyr 
deg å overta en sofa hun ikke har bruk for lenger, og du vurderer å ta imot den.  
 
 
Hvor viktig er det for deg at du: 
 
liker stilen og fargen på sofaen? (sett ring rundt svaret) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
(helt uviktig)         (veldig viktig) 
 
 
at sofaen blir fraktet hjem for deg? (sett ring rundt svaret) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
(helt uviktig)         (veldig viktig) 
 
 
Sofaen er ikke akkurat av en type du ville ha valgt selv, men din bekjente disponerer 
varebil og tilbyr seg å sørge for transporten. Tror du at du vil velge å ta imot sofaen? 
(kryss av)  
 
        Ta imot   
Ikke ta imot  
 
 
Hvor sikker er du på at dette er det riktige valget? (sett ring rundt svaret) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(helt usikker)         (helt sikker) 
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Situasjon 3. 
 
Du er i ferd med å avslutte din utdannelse. Du får tilbud om to svært ulike 
jobber, og må nå bestemme deg for hvilken du skal velge (henholdsvis jobb A og 
B). Problemet er at utdannelsen har gitt deg kompetanse for jobb A, men denne 
utdannelsen tok du hovedsakelig som følge av press fra foreldre og venner. Jobb 
B, på den annen side, appellerer til deg da du har hatt en interesse innenfor dette 
utradisjonelle området i lang tid. 
Hovedforskjellen mellom jobb A og B, er at A garanterer deg god inntekt 
og status, mens B gir større mulighet for personlig utvikling. For å oppnå suksess, 
vil man i jobb A måtte jobbe mye med svært krevende oppgaver i begynnelsen, 
men til gjengjeld vil belønningen komme i form av en meget høy lønn på sikt. 
Lønnen i jobb B derimot, er ganske moderat, men du vil få stor frihet til å utvikle 
deg selv og i tillegg gjøre noe godt for andre.  
 
 
Hvor viktig er det for deg at du: 
 
 
får god lønn? (sett ring rundt svaret) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
(helt uviktig)         (veldig viktig) 
 
 
har mest mulig glede av arbeidet? (sett ring rundt svaret) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
(helt uviktig)         (veldig viktig) 
 
 
får en praktisk reisevei? (sett ring rundt svaret) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
(helt uviktig)         (veldig viktig) 
 
 
Hvilken jobb tror du at du vil velge, jobb A eller B? (kryss av)   
Jobb A  
        Jobb B  
  
 
Hvor sikker er du på at du har valgt riktig? (sett ring rundt svaret) 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(helt usikker)         (helt sikker) 
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Situasjon 4 
 
 
Du er i kveld på en stor studentfest sammen med venner. Du ser en person som 
du synes er svært tiltrekkende. Du vurderer å presentere deg selv for denne 
personen, men nøler fordi du er usikker på om denne attraktive personen vil 
være interessert i å snakke med deg og på hva vennene dine vil tenke om deg.  
 
 
Hvor viktig er det for deg at:  
 
du i alle fall gjør et forsøk på å komme i kontakt (sett ring rundt svaret) 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
(helt uviktig)         (veldig viktig) 
 
 
du risikerer å bli avvist (sett ring rundt svaret) 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
(helt uviktig)         (veldig viktig) 
 
 
du fortsetter å være sammen med venner (sett ring rundt svaret) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
(helt uviktig)         (veldig viktig) 
 
 
Hva tror du at du vil du velge? (Kryss av) 
 
     Presentere deg selv     
     Fortsette å være sammen med vennene  
 
 
Hvor sikker er du på at du har valgt riktig? (sett ring rundt svaret) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(helt usikker)         (helt sikker) 
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      Appendix C. – Experiment 3 
 
    Råd, beslutninger og ansvarlighet 
 
 
 
 
 
Dette spørreskjema er utarbeidet som en del av et forskningsprosjekt om rådgivning og 
beslutningstaking, som pågår ved Psykologisk institutt. Prosjektet inngår som en del av 
masteravhandling for Gro Hege Haraldsen Nordbye, under veiledning av Karl Halvor Teigen. 
Alle besvarelser er anonyme og vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. En kort rapport om 
undersøkelsen vil foreligge senere i semesteret. Eventuelle spørsmål kan rettes til 
ghnordby@student.sv.uio.no.  
 
 
 
 
Bakgrunnsopplysninger: 
 
 
Kjønn (sett ring rundt)   K   M 
 
 
Alder      .............. år 
 
 
Hvor lenge har du studert?   …………år 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Du vil i dette spørreskjemaet få presentert 4 ulike situasjoner der du må ta stilling til hvor 
ansvarlig man er i ulike situasjoner. Tenk deg at dette er situasjoner som du står overfor. Sett 
deg godt inn i situasjonene og svar så godt du kan ut fra hvordan situasjonene er beskrevet og 
den personen du selv er. 
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Situasjon 1 
 
 
Du er med i en kollokviegruppe hvor dere diskuterer hvordan dere skal legge opp 
lesing, fritid og ekstrajobbing de siste månedene før eksamen. Harald, som også 
er med i gruppen, forteller at han har tenkt å konsentrere seg om kun den ene av 
bøkene på pensumslisten. Dette oppfattes som dristig, men Harald hevder at de to 
oppgavene på eksamen sjelden kommer fra samme bok. De andre lar seg overtale 
og nå ivrer de for at du skal gjøre det samme. 
 
Du er avhengig av god karakter, da du gjerne vil videre på studiet, men du innser 
at du ikke rekker å lese begge bøkene grundig dersom du også skal få tid til litt 
jobb og sosialt liv. Du er svært usikker og spør en venn om råd. Du blir anbefalt å 
følge kollokviegruppen og satse på å lese en bok grundig. Etter å ha fått rådet 
ender det med at du følger Harald og resten av kollokviegruppen og leser bare en 
av bøkene grundig. 
 
 
 
 
I hvilken grad er rådgiver ansvarlig for at du valgte å satse på bare en bok? 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%        
(Ikke ansvarlig          (Fullstendig 
overhodet)                ansvarlig) 
 
 
I hvilken grad er du ansvarlig for at du valgte å satse på bare en bok? (ring rundt svaret) 
 
 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%        
(Ikke ansvarlig          (Fullstendig 
overhodet)                ansvarlig) 
 
 
 
I hvilken grad er kollokviegruppen ansvarlig for at du valgte å satse på bare en bok? 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%        
(Ikke ansvarlig          (Fullstendig 
overhodet)                ansvarlig) 
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Situasjon 2 
 
 
 
Du og fire andre venner prater og drikker vin en fredagskveld. Etter hvert 
ønsker dere en tur på byen, men lar dere overtale av vertinnen til å bli litt lenger. 
Da dere endelig skal reise, viser det seg at siste buss allerede har gått. Taxi vil bli 
dyrt med mye venting. Siden du har med bil, ønsker vennene dine at du kjører og 
argumenterer med at du er så godt som edru.  
 
Du føler deg i stand til å kjøre, men er redd konsekvensene for å bli tatt eller 
utsatt for uhell siden du mest sannsynlig befinner deg over promillegrensen. 
Du er svært usikker og ringer en venn for å spørre om råd. Du beskriver 
situasjonen og får til råd at det burde være greit å kjøre i dette aktuelle tilfellet, 
tatt i betraktning at det ville være det mest praktiske og risikoen for at noe skjer 
er svært liten. Du følger rådet og kjører til tross for at du har drukket alkohol. 
 
 
 
 
I hvilken grad er rådgiver ansvarlig for at du valgte å kjøre bil etter å ha drukket 
alkohol? (ring rundt svaret) 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%        
(Ikke ansvarlig          (Fullstendig 
overhodet)                ansvarlig) 
 
 
I hvilken grad er du selv ansvarlig for at du valgte å kjøre bil etter å ha drukket 
alkohol?  
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%        
(Ikke ansvarlig          (Fullstendig 
overhodet)                ansvarlig) 
 
 
I hvilken grad er de andre festdeltakerne ansvarlig for at du valgte å kjøre bil etter å ha 
drukket alkohol?  
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%        
(Ikke ansvarlig          (Fullstendig 
overhodet)                ansvarlig) 
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Situasjon 3 
 
 
 
En profilert forsker har skrevet en artikkel på basis av en studie. Du får tilbud 
om å bli medforfatter av artikkelen, som vil bli forsøkt godkjent i et 
prestisjetungt tidsskrift. Du har hatt en svært liten rolle i denne prosessen og er 
veldig usikker på om du skal ta imot tilbudet. Du søker råd hos en studievenn du 
har tillit til. Hun mener at dette er en gylden sjanse for deg som du ikke må la gå 
fra deg. 
 
Du følger rådet og blir medforfatter, selv om du ikke ville ha tatt denne 
beslutningen på egenhånd. Artikkelen blir godkjent i tidsskriftet, og du blir glad 
av å se ditt eget navn stå der.  
 
 
 
 
I hvilken grad er rådgiver ansvarlig for at du valgte å bli medforfatter?  
(ring rundt svaret) 
 
 
0 % 10 %  20% 30% 40% 50%  60% 70% 80%   90% 100 %  
(ikke ansvarlig          (fullstendig  
i det hele tatt)                  ansvarlig) 
 
 
 
I hvilken grad er du selv ansvarlig for at du valgte å bli medforfatter?  
 
 
0 % 10 %  20% 30% 40% 50%  60% 70% 80%   90% 100 %  
(ikke ansvarlig          (fullstendig  
i det hele tatt)                  ansvarlig) 
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Situasjon 4 
 
 
Du sitter som studentrepresentant i styret ved instituttet og dere vurderer to 
kandidater, henholdsvis Vik og Vang, for et nytt professorat. Vik har hatt mange 
verv ved universitetet, han har også lang erfaring fra undervisning men har gjort 
lite spennende forskning. Vang er yngre og har mindre erfaring med 
undervisning og administrasjon. Til gjengjeld har han publisert noen svært 
interessante arbeider. 
 
I styret er det delte meninger om hvem som bør velges. Instituttstyreren og 
representanten for de administrative går inn for Vik som har mer erfaring.  De to 
vitenskaplig ansatte synes man bør satse på Vang, som har gjort mer spennende 
forskning. Din stemme, som studentrepresentant, vil bli avgjørende. 
 
Du er veldig usikker på hvem du skal velge. Før avstemningen tar du kontakt 
med en venn som du anser som en klok person. Du gir en balansert fremstilling 
om alle sidene ved saken og ber om råd. Vennen din råder deg til slutt å stemme 
på Vang. Du følger rådet.  
 
 
 
 
I hvilken grad er rådgiver ansvarlig for du valgte å stemme på Vang? (ring rundt svaret) 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%        
(Ikke ansvarlig          (Fullstendig 
overhodet)                ansvarlig) 
 
 
I hvilken grad er du selv ansvarlig for at du valgte å stemme på Vang? 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%        
(Ikke ansvarlig          (Fullstendig 
overhodet)                ansvarlig) 
 
 
 
